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INTRODUCTION: THE “NEW” U.S. PREEMPTIVE DOCTRINE OF 2002 AND 2006 
 
The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), leaked to the media in early 2002, allowed for 
the use of nuclear weapons in three scenarios:  
 
1. against targets able to withstand attacks by non-nuclear weapons (such as 
underground bunkers);  
2. in retaliation for an attack with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons;  
3. and “in the event of surprising military developments,” such as an “Iraqi attack on 
Israel or its neighbors, or a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a military 
confrontation over the status of Taiwan.”1  
 
In that same year, the Bush administration declared in its National Security Strategy 
(NSS): “Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely 
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on a reactive posture as we have in the past. . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts the U.S. 
will, if necessary, act preemptively.”2  
 The increased or “new” emphasis on preemptive doctrine was strongly criticized by 
politicians and scholars, but the government reasserted essentially the same policy in its 2006 
National Security Strategy: 
 
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a 
sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of 
inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if 
necessary, act preemptively.
3
  
 
As Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control 
Association, points out: “Actually they’re trying to better market their national security strategy. 
They saw the policy debate, the polls, and the international reaction to their plan, so they may 
have learned a few lessons from the school of hard knocks but they haven’t switched gears and 
decided to work in international coalitions.”4 
The United States’ doctrine of preemptive warfare evidently alarms members of the 
international arms control and disarmament community. This article considers the problems and 
implications of the “new” U.S. preemptive doctrine. It argues that the doctrine cannot continue to 
be credible or sustainable over the long-term. Civil society groups are pressuring North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) governments to reopen the door to further engagement on these 
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questions. In fact, the emerging U.S. doctrine of preemptive warfare is proving to be 
problematic, even amongst its chief proponents in Washington and at NATO headquarters in 
Brussels. It needs formal review by the United States and its allies within NATO, probably at the 
same time as the alliance reconsiders its traditional “Strategic Concept.” Recent interviews by 
the author in Washington and at NATO headquarters indicate that policy makers may review the 
inconsistencies between the United States’ reliance upon nuclear deterrence and NATO’s 
adherence to the Strategic Concept in conjunction with the alliance’s sixtieth anniversary 
celebrations in 2009.  
 
PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF PREEMPTIVE DOCTRINE  
 
The U.S. development of more nuclear weapons-related technologies for fighting 
limited nuclear wars on the battlefield, and in space, will make their use more, not less likely. 
Threatening to use preemptive nuclear retaliation against terrorist groups or rogue states makes 
nuclear war more “credible” now than it has been since the Cuban missile crisis. While it is 
certainly true that Americans cannot sit idly by while their security is undermined, the route 
they are taking—asserting nuclear credibility—will result in a more insecure world with a 
greater, not less, likelihood of nuclear war. The Western alliance’s concepts of nuclear 
deterrence and nuclear preemption need to move away from the traditional notion of 
“defending” against threats—such as strategic or tactical nuclear weapons—as well as the 
newer notion of “offensively” using preemptive nuclear strikes. Instead, the emphasis must be 
placed on achieving “minimal” nuclear deterrence and, eventually, nuclear abolition.   
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If the U.S. continues on its present trajectory—threatening to respond or preempt a 
nuclear, biological, or chemical attack possibly with nuclear weaponry—it will incite an arms 
race where many states will seek to deter or preempt using all types of new weapons, including 
enhanced radiation weapons, space control satellites, and nuclear-survivable communications 
systems. The costs for the world will be enormous as countries compete to design weapons for 
use against possibly undeterrable terrorists, on rogue state battlefields, and in outer space. As a 
statement on nuclear weapons policy issued by the board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation 
pointed out: “It is the U.S. insistence on retaining a nuclear weapons option that sets the tone for 
the world as a whole. . . . In this post-September 11
th
 climate, the United States has suddenly 
become for other governments a country to be deterred rather than, as in the Cold War, a country 
practicing deterrence to discourage aggression by others.”5 
 
THERE ARE NO GUARANTEES THAT THREATS OF RETALIATION OR PREEMPTION SUCCEED IN 
PREVENTING ATTACK 
 
The United States’ allies need to ask themselves in the months leading up to NATO’s 
sixtieth anniversary and the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference whether 
nuclear weapons protect them by deterring potential aggressors from attacking. During the Cold 
War, strategists assumed that by threatening massive retaliation, nuclear weapons could credibly 
prevent an enemy from attacking. September 11
th
 demonstrated there are no guarantees that the 
threats of preemption or retaliation will succeed in preventing an attack—indeed, it may be 
difficult to retaliate against a substate opponent, like a terrorist group. Moreover, traditional 
arguments against classical deterrence still hold true. There are many ways that deterrence and/or 
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preemption could fail, including misunderstanding, miscalculation, poor communication, 
irrational leadership, and accident.
6
 
But there is little likelihood that hard-line strategists will come to reject the doctrine of 
deterrence in its various permutations. Will this generation of strategic decision makers need to 
retire or die before the Great Powers, particularly American policymakers, relinquish their 
convictions about deterrence? Many decision makers in the upper echelons of the North 
American policy debate continue to surmise that nuclear deterrence has succeeded, and will 
continue to succeed, because there was no large-scale nuclear war between the U.S. and the 
USSR during the Cold War. Bureaucratic recalcitrance also prevents changes in defense policy 
that defy even the best high-level intentions.
7
 
 
YET THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION DECIDED TO THINK CRITICALLY ABOUT MUTUAL ASSURED 
DESTRUCTION 
 
Recent evidence indicates that, in the wake of the September 11
th
 crisis, decision makers 
in the highest echelons of American decision making (including President Bush and his closest 
advisors) began to doubt the efficacy of deterrence and think more critically about this strategy. 
Clearly the President held traditional assumptions about deterrence before the attack on America. 
Five minutes after American Airlines Flight 77 slammed into the Pentagon, he reached his vice 
president, Dick Cheney. “We’re at war,” Bush said. When the president hung up, he turned to 
some of his staff on Air Force One who had heard his comment to Cheney. “That’s what we’re 
paid for boys. We’re going to take care of this. And when we find out who did this, they’re not 
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going to like me as president. Somebody is going to pay.” A few minutes later, Bush said to 
Cheney, “We’re going to find out who did this and we’re going to kick their asses.”8 
Barely a month later, Bush and Cheney were far less certain about whether Osama bin 
Laden would be deterred by America’s threat to reserve the right to use any means at its disposal 
to respond to any use of weapons of mass destruction. At a National Security Council meeting on 
October 9, Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield discussed the 
possibility that bin Laden (whom they referred to as UBL) might have weapons of mass 
destruction. “UBL might not be deterrable,” said Cheney. “Well,” the president said, “sponsoring 
nations of UBL, those that support him, might have some influence with him. Should we send 
some messages, private or public?” “We need to think some more about this,” said Rumsfeld.9  
Unfortunately, their thinking led them to quickly and closely embrace the doctrine of 
preemptive warfare. Tellingly, during the second presidential debate with John Kerry, George 
Bush argued for stronger offenses because terrorists only need to succeed once for defenses to 
fail—and defenses cannot necessarily be fail-safe one-hundred percent of the time.10 It seems 
that strong advocates of deterrence from the “New Right,” like Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld, 
came to reluctantly recognize that deterrence could fail to work with substate actors and a more 
credible alternative was needed. They chose to reissue the National Security Strategy of 2002 in 
essentially its same form in 2006, despite widespread international criticism. 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTIVE NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT CONTINUE TO BE CREDIBLE OR 
SUSTAINABLE OVER THE LONG-TERM  
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Nevertheless, the doctrine of preemptive nuclear war promises to be neither credible nor 
sustainable over the long-term. Especially as attitudes toward nuclear weapons change in the 
future, it will become ever more difficult for leaders to credibly threaten nuclear use. The images 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain etched on the mindsets of decision makers.
11
 Future 
discussions about the merits and demerits of adopting U.S. preemptive doctrine (perhaps as 
NATO’s official policy) will no doubt be marred by massive disagreement and vocal dissension. 
That is why European diplomats wisely avoid the doctrinal discussions so eagerly welcomed by 
a few American diplomats at NATO. Indeed, indications are that the European and Canadian 
allies of the United States in NATO will avoid any review or discussion of NATO’s nuclear 
policy in favor of sustained attention to Afghanistan, Iraq, and/or peacekeeping in the Balkans. 
They will hope the informed public will be distracted from considering deeply disturbing 
questions surrounding possible nuclear war.
12
 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS ARE PRESSURING NATO GOVERNMENTS TO REOPEN THE DOOR TO 
FURTHER ENGAGEMENT ON THESE QUESTIONS 
 
It will be left up to members of the domestic public—particularly NGOs that are active 
on nuclear disarmament issues—to pressure NATO governments to reopen the door to further 
engagement on these questions. While NATO conducted a review process of its reliance on 
nuclear weapons in 1999-2000, its reexamination of the Strategic Concept simply reaffirmed its 
central tenet—that nuclear weapons are “essential.”  
Although NATO decision makers assert that this review—the paragraph 32 process—is 
finished, some NATO governments are being pressured (among others by the International 
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Pugwash Conferences, the Canadian Pugwash Group, the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear 
Responsibility, and Project Ploughshares) to reopen the door to further engagement on the 
question.
13
 Civil society groups in all the NATO countries need to ask themselves why NATO’s 
nuclear force posture has not been reviewed since 1999, and is essentially the same in policy 
terms as it has been since 1967.
14
 Considering the sea-changes to the international security 
environment since the end of the Cold War and 9/11, NATO’s status quo stance is not 
contributing anything of political or military value to its credibility. 
 
BRITISH POLICY RELIES UPON ITS INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENT BUT SHIES AWAY FROM 
DECLARING PREEMPTIVE USE 
 
Sometime after the leak of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, a widely-reported speech by 
Britain’s Defense Secretary Geoffrey Hoon appeared to echo the Bush administration’s stance: 
“They [rogue states] can be absolutely confident that in the right conditions we would be willing 
to use our nuclear weapons.” Moreover, Hoon told a parliamentary defense committee, 
“Although the Cold War is over, we face new, emerging threats. It is right that we consider all 
possible elements of a comprehensive strategy.”15 Hoon also later insisted that the government 
“reserved the right” to use nuclear weapons if Britain or British troops deployed abroad were 
threatened by chemical or biological weapons.”16 The problem for observers of the permutations 
in Hoon’s thinking became discerning whether British policy had changed or whether Hoon’s 
comments were cleverly meant to be deliberately “off-the-cuff” comments designed to enhance 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent posture based on mutual assured destruction and/or preemption.  
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The British government’s December 2006 paper did not answer these questions 
unequivocally. The U.K. nuclear arsenal will continue to contain about 200 warheads, all carried 
on Trident II missiles based on Vanguard-class submarines, thus contributing, arguably, to a 
stable deterrent posture.
17
 The British government has also announced that it intends to begin 
work on a new generation of missile submarines to be deployed around 2025.
18
 While there is 
some opposition within the U.K. to this plan,
19
 the recent British Defense Paper is widely 
considered at NATO to be an unequivocal declaration of faith in Britain’s continued reliance 
upon nuclear deterrence.
20
 Is the U.K intent upon possible preemptive use of nuclear weapons, as 
Hoon hinted so strongly? This is more difficult to figure out. British officers in charge of nuclear 
planning at NATO headquarters, in off-record comments, think that Hoon’s style of issuing a 
deterrent threat was cleverer than the U.S. declared policy because it did not incite public discord 
or much discussion. They most fear an inharmonious debate within NATO circles of the 
implications of U.S. preemptive strategy for British and alliance nuclear policy. They believe the 
British and European general public’s preference to rely upon the U.S. “ultimate” deterrent and 
Britain and France’s “second lines of defense” mean that any discussion of possible “first use” of 
British nuclear weapons must be avoided.   
British diplomats at NATO headquarters tend to think decisions to retain the Trident II 
missiles (and thus remain a nuclear weapon state) are consistent with Britain’s essential support 
of classical nuclear deterrence. The opposite argument—that by renewing the Trident system, 
Britain has missed the opportunity to lead NATO toward denuclearization—is met with derision 
because, after all, in their widely shared view, Britain must never give up its independent 
reliance on its own nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, whether NATO should shape its official 
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doctrine to reflect U.S. preemptive doctrine is a question brewing quietly in their own minds, but 
they are very reluctant to discuss it for fear of public dissension and domestic discord.
21
 
 
FRENCH NUCLEAR POLICY REMAINS DELIBERATELY AMBIGUOUS 
 
Although much smaller than the U.S. and Russian arsenals, France’s nuclear arsenal is 
the world’s third largest, containing about 350 warheads. The bulk of its arsenal is in the Force 
Océanique Stratégique. France is planning new warheads on new versions of its cruise and 
submarine launched missiles. In 2010–2015, four Triomphant-class submarines will be 
retrofitted with the 6,000-km-range M51.1 submarine launched ballistic missile.
22
 At NATO 
headquarters, the French deterrent is referred to in common parlance as the French force de 
frappe and there is very little consideration of its implications for NATO policy. 
In keeping with the change in U.S. policy, in November 2002, a French defense bill noted 
that “preemptive action is not out of the question where explicit and confirmed threats have been 
recognized.”23 At NATO headquarters, the French delegation seems to remain focused on 
deterrence and prevention, but it is difficult for other delegations to discern their motives and 
understand their arguments. Repeatedly over the last decade, NATO diplomats from other 
delegations have indicated that they find the French approach and French diplomats to be 
deliberately ambiguous, more frustrating than even the Russians, and tremendously difficult to 
cope with at the committee level from a policy making perspective. Yet it seems evident that the 
concept of preemption, as related to “imminent threat,” is now part of French strategy because of 
comments, among others, by a high-level diplomat in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group:  
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The perfect example of someone who knew how to talk about deterrence effectively was 
Jacques Chirac in his great speech, was it last year? He was very good at making a 
statement that we have these weapons and if you attack us, we will use them. This is the 
essence of deterrence. . . . We can’t say we’ll never use them; this is the essential 
conundrum we face; the French made no bones about it and they even made claims of 
preemption in their speech.
24
  
 
NATO’S NUCLEAR POLICY REQUIRES ITS OWN STOCKPILE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
 
NATO also has its own force of approximately 100 gravity bombs. These are commonly 
referred to as “sub-strategic” or “tactical nuclear weapons”—any term is sufficient. U.S. tactical 
nuclear weapons are deployed in six European NATO countries, five of which are non-nuclear 
weapon states (NNWS). All five—Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey25—
have “nuclear-sharing” agreements with the U.S., under which they maintain aircraft equipped to 
carry nuclear weapons and pilots trained to deliver them. U.S. nuclear weapons under U.S. 
custody are stored in Europe for these aircraft. If a decision were made by NATO to use these 
weapons, they would be delivered by the air forces of these five supposedly non-nuclear weapon 
states. While the decision to use them would be ultimately the American President’s, NATO 
forces train to use them and the nuclear warheads are spread upon the soil of the six NATO 
allies. Defense policy makers in Washington and Brussels who support deterrence argue that the 
NATO countries must retain these weapons, despite their relatively less importance, in order to 
show their commitment to the NATO alliance. Any talk of not upgrading the dual-capable 
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weapons that would carry the tactical nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated as it is evidence of a 
weakening of the extended deterrent relationship.
26
 
Once this complicated line of reasoning is understood—that there are essentially three 
levels of deterrence, with the ultimate deterrent being held by the United States—it is logical for 
defenders of deterrence to argue that NATO cannot disarm its tactical nuclear weapons as this 
would be seen as a weakening of the ultimate deterrent relationship with the United States. As 
one retired general explained, NATO cannot rid itself of its tactical nuclear weapons as this 
would be a “slippery slope” toward disarmament.27 In many ways, the tactical nuclear weapons 
exert a far more symbolic than tactically useful impact. Any weakening is shunned and the 
sentiment is repeated over and over again in all types of interviews with American and European 
decision makers, whether they are in NATO’s Secretary-General’s office or active in 
Washington or New York.  
 
U.S., FRENCH, AND BRITISH PREEMPTIVE DOCTRINES CONFLICT WITH NATO NUCLEAR 
POLICY 
 
There were some expectations that the U.S. might plausibly temper its preemptive 
doctrine in light of international criticism, and in light of the trend among the other NWS to 
develop similar preemptive doctrines. But members of the U.S. strategic policy and arms control 
communities in Washington were not particularly taken by surprise or perplexed by the U.S. 
decision in the spring of 2006 to reissue the basic elements of the National Security Strategy. 
The new concept of “preemptive” or ”preventive” strategy that was reasserted in 2006 and 
continues to be the foundation of emerging U.S. nuclear doctrine is just now beginning to be 
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considered at NATO headquarters in terms of its implications for NATO’s Strategic Concept and 
nuclear nonproliferation.  
Curiously, the leaders of the non-nuclear NATO countries continue to profess their 
reliance on the traditional strategy of nuclear deterrence while the U.S. moves toward a 
preemptive “first-strike” strategy that promises to retaliate with nuclear weapons, even in the 
event of a “limited” chemical or biological attack. The situation is similar to the late 1950s and 
1960s when the allies continued to rely upon mutual assured destruction (MAD) even as the U.S. 
developed “flexible response.”28 To explain, the Strategic Concept links the NATO NNWS to 
the overall nuclear policies of the NATO nuclear weapon states (NWS) by asserting that, “The 
supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the 
Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United 
Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall 
deterrence and security of the Allies.”29 The Strategic Concept directly implicates the NATO 
NNWS in NATO’s nuclear plans and force posture:  
 
A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of alliance solidarity and 
common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by 
European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime 
basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation 
arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an 
essential political and military link between the European and the North American 
members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in 
Europe.
30
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Recent interviews at NATO headquarters indicate some sort of in-depth review of 
NATO’s nuclear doctrine, perhaps in time for NATO’s sixtieth anniversary celebrations in 
2009, may be forthcoming. Changes in nuclear doctrine can also be expected either preceding 
or in the wake of changes in the U.S. administration.
31
 Finally, we need to remember that 
efforts to change NATO’s deterrent policy can begin at the nation-state level.32 The thrust for 
NATO’s 1999 review essentially began because Canada’s parliament released a report calling 
for a reexamination of NATO’s reliance on nuclear deterrence and the Strategic Concept.33 
Canada’s former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy committed his department to attempt to 
change NATO’s nuclear doctrine—for which he was often labeled a “nuclear nag.”34 Working 
together with Joschka Fisher, the then German Foreign Minister, these critics of NATO policy 
attempted to persuade NATO diplomats that the alliance needed to reconsider its reliance on 
nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes. In the final analysis, even American diplomats at 
NATO headquarters were impressed with the Canadian/German initiative and the 
determination of the Canadian Foreign Minister and his diplomatic aides.
35
 In a similar fashion, 
working together with other like-minded “middle powers,” such as Germany, Norway, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands, it might be possible to reforge NATO’s nuclear doctrine.36 One 
option that is gaining popularity is the idea of strengthening the “moderate middle” of the 
debate among the non-nuclear weapon states in the UN and NATO. It will be especially 
important to do so as we move toward 2010 when there could be a significant weakening of the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime.   
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